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amount of disability benefits paid. Any compromise of a cause of
action by the injured employee in an amount less than the benefits
provided for in the Act shall be made only with the written consent
of either the Chairman of the Board or the carrier. If the injured
employee who has received benefits fails to commence an action
against the third person within six months prior to the expiration
of the statute of limitations, the carrier or the Chairman of the Board
may maintain an action against the third party.24
Waiver, Release and Exemption of Payments from Claims
Any agreement to waive rights under this Act shall be void.
Disability benefits may not be assigned or released and shall be ex-
empt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution and at-
tachment. 25 However, attorney's fees for services in connection with
any contested claim under the Act shall become a lien upon the bene-
fits, if these fees have been approved by the Board. The lien shall
be paid from the proceeds only in the manner fixed by the Board.26
Conclusion
"What the New York Law provides is analogous to the concept
of minimum wage. That is to say the statutory provision for dis-
ability benefits is a mandated standard, obligatory for employers and
their employees who do not or cannot agree on something better;
but where they can and do agree the widest latitude is allowed them
to work out the solutions best suited to their own needs." 27 Some
of the opposition to the Act in its present form was based on the
contentions that the employer pay all the contributions, or that the
state insurance fund constitute the sole insuring agent to the exclu-
sion of private companies. Whatever the merit of these criticisms,
the bill does offer to industry and labor an opportunity of proving
that social betterment can be fostered by joint effort on their part
with a minimum of state interference.
JAMES LYSAGHT.
AN ACT TO AMIEND THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT IN RELATION TO
ADVERSE POSSESSION By TENANTS IN COMMON OF REAL PROPERTY.
-The one distinctive characteristic of every cotenancy is the right
of each tenant in common, with his cotenants, to the possession of
241d. §227(1), (2), (3).
251d. §218(1), (2).
2 Id. § 225.
27 Miss M. Donlon's address before the House Ways and Means Corn-
mittee on H. R. 2893, reported in the Insurance Advocate, April 30, 1949,
p. 19, col. 2.
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the premises so held in common. A necessary corollary to this rule
is the principle that the possession of one cotenant is the possession
of all and therefore not adverse to the interests of the others., How-
ever, it is a well settled general legal principle that a tenant in com-
mon may, by ousting his cotenant and remaining in uninterrupted
possession for fifteen years, acquire title by adverse possession; but
this may only be done by a notice from one cotenant to another that
the former claims adversely to the latter's title, by refusal to account
for rents and profits, or by unequivocal acts, open and public, making
the possession so visible, hostile, exclusive and notorious that notice
may be presumed.2
The reason for the rule requiring an ouster is explained by Judge
Blackmar in Berger v. Horsfield 3 wherein he states ". . . the rule
is founded on the principle underlying the doctrine of adverse posses-
sion. As the title gained by adverse possession rests upon laches of
the real owner, who fails to assert his title against the one claiming
adversely, and as a tenant in common may be rightfully in possession
by virtue of his own title, the tenant in common out of possession
may rest quiescent without laches until charged with knowledge that
his cotenant's possession is hostile to his title." 4 In other words,
the degree of proof required in cases where privity of title exists is
greater because there exists a quasi trust 5 or confidential relationship
between cotenants; and this relationship creates an implied obliga-
tion on the part of each cotenant to sustain and protect the common
title.6
While the sole possession of one cotenant is prima facie not ad-
verse to the other, it may, as has been indicated, become adverse to
him, and whether it has so become adverse is ordinarily a question
of fact,7 e.g., do the acts relied upon constitute an ouster? Do they
fulfill the requirement of notice? Was the possession hostile, exclu-
sive and notorious?
Because the question of adverse possession is ordinarily one of
fact for a jury, the uncertainties which accompany the determination
I Clute v. Clute, 197 N. Y. 439, 90 N. E. 988 (1910) ; Sweetland v. Buell,
164 N. Y. 541, 58 N. E. 663 (1900).
2 Kielbinski v. Sitko, - Misc. -, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
Zapf v. Carter, 70 App. Div. 395, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1971 (4th Dep't 1902);
Sweetland v. Buell, 164 N. Y. 541, 58 N. E. 663 (1900); Hamershlag v.
Duryea, 38 App. Div. 130, 56 N. Y. Supp. 615 (1st Dep't 1899); Culver v.
Rhodes, 87 N. Y. 348 (1882).
3 188 App. Div. 649, 176 N. Y. Supp. 854 (2d Dep't 1919).
4 Id. at 653, 176 N. Y. Supp. at 856.
5 Markowitz v. Markowitz et al., - Misc. -, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 261 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 993, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 991 (Ist Dep't 1943); Minion
v. Warner, 238 N. Y. 413, 144 N. E. 665 (1924).
6 Schenck v. Egbert, 56 Misc. 378, 107 N. Y. Supp. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1907);
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 131 N. Y. 101, 29 N. E. 1013 (1892); Knolls v.
Barnhart, 71 N. Y. 474 (1887).7 Berger v. Horsfield, 188 App. Div. 649, 176 N. Y. Supp. 854 (2d Dep't
1919); Clark v. Crego, 47 Barb. 599 (N. Y. 1867).
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of such issues naturally attach themselves to any claim of title by
adverse possession and not infrequently render the title in question
unmarketable.
The title may be rendered unmarketable because an attorney in
examining the title may find that in the chain of title there was a
tenant in common who never conveyed. Assuming the statutory
period has passed, the issues which arise are: has someone acquired
title by adverse possession, or, did the non-conveying tenant have
sufficient notice that possession was adverse to him? Then again, an
attorney may run across facts which show that title to the premises
passed by intestacy to the heirs of a deceased title holder some years
previous but that there was no judicial determination of who the
heirs were. Since heirs of real property take as tenants in common
the question arises, was there a valid conveyance by all the heirs as
cotenants? Since these vexatious problems have a habit of arising
many years after the beginning of the cotenancy, not infrequently the
actual proof of the original ouster has become lost by lapse of time
and the cotenancy appears as an outstanding flaw in the title due to
the presumption indulged in by the courts that possession of one co-
tenant is presumed to be for the benefit of all and not adverse.8
The risk consequent to a reliance upon a claim of title by adverse
possession is clearly shown in the case of Berger v. Horsfield 9 where-
in the plaintiff and his predecessors occupied the premises for a
period of eighty-three years, collected all the rents and profits with-
out accounting, without any assertion by the cotenants of any claim
against the property; when the whole property was attempted to be
sold, the Appellate Division held it was a question of fact whether
title had been acquired by adverse possession, and resolved the ques-
tion in the negative, sustaining the lower court determination.
In order to eliminate such difficulties and uncertainties in the
conveyance of real property and to avoid expensive actions in equity
to quiet title, the New York Legislature in its 172nd session, upon
the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission,1" amended
the Civil Practice Act by inserting therein a new section to be known
as Section forty-one-a. 11 The new section became law with the ap-
proval of the Governor on March 18, 1949 and took effect immedi-
ately. Its purpose is to limit to fifteen years the presumption that
occupancy by one tenant in common is possession of the other.' 2 It
8 Tarbox v. Hulett, 272 App. Div. 633, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 37 (3d Dep't 1947),
wherein failure of two tenants in common to join in a conveyance though such
tenants were unheard from for over twenty years rendered title of the prop-
erty unmarketable when conveyed by a third cotenant.
9 188 App. Div. 649, 176 N. Y. Supp. 854 (2d Dep't 1919).
10 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 65(J), 1949 REPoRT, LAw RFvisioN CommIssioN.
"I Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 184.
12 1949 LEG. Doc. No. 65(J), 1949 REPoaR, LAW REvIsIoN CommIssIoN.
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likewise provides that ouster of one tenant by the other destroys the
presumption.
The text of the new section reads as follows:
§ 41-a. Adverse possession by tenants in common. Where the
relation of tenants in common has existed between any persons,
the occupancy of one tenant, personally or by his servant or by
his tenant, is deemed to have been the possession of the other,
notwithstanding that the tenant so occupying the premises has
acquired another title or has claimed to hold adversely to the
other. But this presumption shall not be made after the expira-
tion of fifteen years of continued occupancy by such tenant, per-
sonally or by his servant or by his tenant, or after an ouster by
one tenant of the other.
§ 2. Section forty-one-a of the civil practice act as added by
this act shall apply to past as well as present and future occu-
pancies by tenants in common; provided, however, that in the
case of occupancies prior to the time this act shall take effect,
the date upon which the presumption described in section forty-
one-a of the civil practice act shall be deemed to have expired
by lapse of time shall be (a) the date of the completion of fifteen
years of continuous occupancy by such tenant, personally or by
his servant or by his tenant, or (b) September first, nineteen
hundred thirty-five, whichever date is later.
§ 3. This act shall take effect immediately.' 3
The new statute is not without justification. There is a strong
analogy between the relations between tenants in common and those
of landlord and tenant with respect to adverse possession, the rule
relating to the latter being that possession of the tenant, even after
the expiration of the lease, is presumed to be that of the landlord,
however this presumption is limited to a period of fifteen years after
the termination of the tenancy by Section 41 of the Civil Practice
Act.14
It is evident that the legislature in enacting Section 41-a has
sought to remove the prime source of uncertainty, i.e., that adverse
possession is a question of fact. Thus, by limiting the period of the
presumption of the continuancy of the cotenancy, the statutory period
necessary for the establishment of title by adverse possession can
begin to run after fifteen years of continued undisturbed possession
by one tenant the same as if an actual ouster had been shown. The
presumption of ouster of one cotenant from continued undisturbed
possession for fifteen years by the other is reasonable and justified
because the average person does not ordinarily sleep on his rights
13 Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 184.
24 Laws of N. Y. 1938, c. 97.
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for so long a period. Furthermore, it is fair to infer that actual proof
of the original ouster has become lost through the lapse of time.
It is to be noted that the new Section 41-a applies to past, present
and future occupancies but the legislature in its endeavor to remove
the source of grievance has not lost sight of the rights of the co-
tenants out of possession. Their rights are adequately guarded by
the safety clause as found in sub-section (2) which limits the retro-
active application of the new statute so that a tenant in common who
has been out of possession for more than fifteen years has a reason-
able time to assert his rights and thereby prevent the tenant in pos-
session from obtaining a title by adverse possession.
The statutory amendment is a recognition by the legislature of
the need for freer and less complicated rules of law relating to trans-
fers of real property and to that end it is submitted that the new
amendment will facilitate the clearing of titles.
JOSEPH C. BRUEN.
UNIFORM SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS LAw.-Every year over a
hundred thousand men desert their wives and families. There are at
least a million deserted dependents in the United States, three-
quarters of whom are children under sixteen.' The direct cost of
supporting these dependents is over fifty million dollars. Indirectly
many more millions are spent fighting the resulting crime, juvenile
delinquency, illness and allied ills. 2 Add to this what price you will
for the human misery which always accompanies the disintegration
of a home and some idea of the import of this social cancer will be
realized.
Fortunately there are some restrictions on the impunity with
which husbands may abandon their families. Applicable within Neiv
York State there are laws forming a tight network of protection for
wives and children. Chiefly administered by the Children's Court
and the Domestic Relations Court of New York City, their jurisdic-
tion unfortunately ends at the state and city line.3 When once the
delinquent husband had fled the state, they were powerless. To be
sure there was one weapon available to the authorities but so cum-
I According to figures obtained from the Abandonment Bureau of the Kings
County District Attorney's office, in 1948 in Brooklyn alone 1,558 women and
children were abandoned.
Number of children under 16 .................................... 977
Number of pregnant wives ..................................... 22
Number of non-pregnant wives ................................ 559
Not all cases were reported.
2 Woodbury, Runaway Husbands, LADIEs HOME JOURNAL, September 1949,
p. 34.
3 N. Y. CHILDREN'S CT. ACT §§ 30-34; N. Y. Do-m. REL. CT. AcT §§ 91-159.
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